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The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question
argument and Frege’s puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to
a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise;
and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning
(which, given certain meaning-platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal
instantiation of Leibniz’s law). Given these parallels, each is sound just in case the other
is. They are, in fact, unsound. The essay first argues that reformulations of these argu-
ments directly in terms of Leibniz’s law are unsound and then that subarguments of the
metalinguistic versions are unsound for structurally similar reasons. Finally, given how
the theory/observation distinction is deployed in linguistic practice, the meaning-platonist
assumptions are shown to be optional.
Shouldn’t philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in gram-
mar? All due respect for governesses—but hasn’t the time come
for philosophy to renounce the faith of governesses?
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886
0 Introduction
Moore’s (1903) open question argument has exerted a tremendous influence
on the thought and imagination of twentieth century metaethicists. After the
centenary of its publication, perhaps it is time for a reassessment.
Indeed, reassessment is needed. The similarities between the open question
argument and Frege’s puzzle have so far been overlooked. As I will argue,
they are variants of the same argument. But once one appreciates the parallel,
much of the standard commentary on the open question argument and its role
in the case for nonnaturalism is inadequate. Not only can we learn something
about the open question argument by appreciating the parallel, but so too can
we learn something about Frege’s puzzle.
There is an intuitively obvious though hard to define distinction between
normative and descriptive predicates. Normative predicates include good,
right, rational, justified, and so on. As our examples suggest, normative
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predicates will be understood broadly enough to include both moral and non-
moral expressions. Descriptive predicates include blue, taller than, means,
believes, and so on.1 The distinction is intuitively obvious at least in the
sense that, over a wide range of cases, competent speakers can reliably classif-
y predicates as normative or descriptive. There may be disagreement over
recalcitrant cases. (Is dangerous a normative or descriptive predicate?) But
where there is disagreement, this disagreement is substantive. The parties
disagree about whether a given predicate is normative or descriptive; they need
not disagree about the nature or existence of the linguistic distinction. As a
working hypothesis I will assume that the distinction between normative and
descriptive predicates constitutes a partition—that every predicate is norma-
tive or descriptive but not both.
There is a metaphysical distinction corresponding to this linguistic dis-
tinction. Thus I will speak of normative and descriptive properties. Every
property is either normative or descriptive. But in order for the metaphysical
distinction to constitute a partition, it must be the case that no property is
both normative and descriptive. There are two ways to understand the meta-
physical distinction:
1 Normative properties are distinct in kind from descriptive properties.
2 Normative properties are a distinct subkind of descriptive properties.
                                                                                                        
1. As my examples of descriptive predicates make clear, I will follow tradition in counting
semantic predicates and the predicates of intentional psychology as descriptive predi-
cates. This is controversial. If Kripke’s (1980) Wittgenstein is to be believed, then such
predicates are implicitly normative. Specifically, Kripke’s Wittgenstein maintains that
sentences such as:
Snow is white means in English that snow is white.
entail normative sentences such as:
A competent speaker of English should only assertively utter Snow is white
if snow is white.
and so the meaning ascription is itself a normative sentence. And similar reasoning pur-
ports to establish that propositional attitude ascriptions are themselves normative sen-
tences. Not every philosopher agrees. (See Horwich, 1995, and Rosen, 1997.) Thus some
maintain that all that is entailed is a conditional sentence:
If a competent speaker of English should only assertively utter true sen-
tences, then a competent speaker of English should only assertively utter
Snow is white if snow is white.
and that this is insufficient to establish that the corresponding meaning ascription is a
normative sentence. This is relevant to metaethical debate since many believe that if the
normative is reducible to the descriptive, then a successful reduction will appeal to inten-
tional-psychological properties. But if intentional-psychological properties are themselves
normative, then no reduction has been effected. For the purposes of the present essay,
however, I will assume that Kripke’s critics are correct.
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Understood the former way, the metaphysical distinction constitutes a parti-
tion; understood the latter way, the metaphysical distinction does not. Accord-
ing to the former understanding, normative and descriptive properties differ in
kind, and so no normative property is a descriptive property. But as every
property would be normative or descriptive but not both, the metaphysical
distinction would constitute a partition. According to the latter understanding,
normative properties are a subkind of descriptive properties, and so some
descriptive properties are normative properties. But while every property
would be normative or descriptive, some descriptive properties would be
normative, and so the metaphysical distinction would not constitute a parti-
tion. Moore is concerned to argue for the former understanding of the meta-
physical distinction. Moral properties are normative properties, and Moore
argues that moral properties differ in kind from descriptive properties—that
moral properties are nonnatural properties. Given that Moore argues for this
conclusion, we do not want to assume it at the outset. So while we will
assume that every property is normative or descriptive, we will initially sus-
pend judgment about whether any property is both normative and descriptive.
What is the relationship between the linguistic and metaphysical distinc-
tions? I will assume that normative predicates denote normative properties (if
they denote at all), and that descriptive predicates denote descriptive proper-
ties. I will not make the corresponding assumptions that only properties
denoted by normative predicates are normative, and that only properties
denoted by descriptive predicates are descriptive. These latter assumptions in
conjunction with the assumption that the distinction between normative and
descriptive predicates constitutes a partition would entail that the metaphysi-
cal distinction itself constitutes a partition. If every predicate were normative
or descriptive but not both, and a property were normative or descriptive only
if it were denoted by a normative or descriptive predicate, then every property
would be normative or descriptive but not both. But this would beg the ques-
tion against moral descriptivists.
1 The Open Question Argument
In arguing that goodness is a simple, indefinable property, Moore emphasizes
that by definition he does not mean verbal definition, i.e., definitions of the
form:
Good in English means...
Whereas verbal definitions are contingent, a posteriori, and synthetic,2 the
definitions that Moore has in mind are necessary, a priori, and analytic.
                                                                                                        
2. Thus the word good could have been conventionally used to denote some property other
than goodness. So the verbal definition of good is contingent. Moreover, experience is
required in order to know the verbal definition of good. Indeed, as Moore explicitly rec-
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Moreover, Moore emphasizes that whereas verbal definitions have a linguistic
subject matter (they are about the English word good), analytic definitions
concern the nature of goodness. Moore’s observation is an instance of the
laudable injunction not to confuse use with mention. Unfortunately, his sub-
sequent discussion fails, in large part, to observe this injunction. Moore’s
talk of indefinable properties prefigures this failure—whereas it makes sense
to speak of a predicate as being indefinable, it does not make sense (except as
a courtesy) to speak of the denoted property as being indefinable.
Could there be a nontrivial definition of the word good in purely descrip-
tive vocabulary? Could good, for example, be defined as what we desire to
desire? Moore believes that we can establish that the universal closure of the
biconditional:
x is good iff x is what we desire to desire
is not a definition even if all and only good things were, in fact, what we
desire to desire. If it were indeed a definition, then not only must its universal
closure be true, but it must exhaustively determine the very meaning of the
word good. But Moore believes that we can decisively establish that good
and what we desire to desire are not synonyms.
Suppose the predicates good and what we desire to desire were indeed
synonymous. Now consider the following question:3
Granted that x is what we desire to desire, is x good?
Moore maintains that no matter what you think the answer is, this question
is just as intelligible as the following question:
Is x good?
But if good meant just the same as what we desire to desire, then we could
always replace one with the other in any sentence without changing that
                                                                                                        
ognizes, establishing the truth of a verbal definition would require statistical evidence
about the use of definiendum in the given linguistic community. So the verbal definition of
good is a posteriori. Moreover, the verbal definition of good is synthetic. Notice a com-
petent speaker that understands the sentence:
Bon in French means good.
may still lack sufficient evidence to know that the proposition that it expresses is true. By
parity of reasoning, a competent speaker’s understanding of a verbal definition of good
would itself be insufficient to know that the proposition that it expresses is true. Since
verbal definitions cannot be known by competent speakers solely on the basis of their
understanding of them, verbal definitions are not analytic but are, rather, synthetic.
3 Throughout questions are understood to be sentences in the interrogative mood.
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sentence’s meaning.4 So if good were correctly defined as what we desire to
desire, then the question:
Granted that x is what we desire to desire, is x good?
would mean just the same as the question:
Granted that x is good, is x good?
But whereas it is perfectly intelligible to ask the former question, it is absurd
to ask the latter. Whereas the former question is open—merely understanding
the question is not sufficient for knowing its answer, the latter question is
closed—merely understanding the question is sufficient for knowing its
answer. So these two questions do not mean the same, and thus good is
nonsynonymous with what we desire to desire. But if good and what w e
desire to desire are nonsynonymous, then good is not correctly defined as
what we desire to desire.5
Moore’s method is perfectly general—no feature specific to the candidate
definition was appealed to. So if the open question argument is a sound
argument that good cannot be defined as what we desire to desire, it is the
basis of a sound argument that good cannot be defined in terms of any
descriptive predicate. One need only run the argument for every candidate
descriptive definition. Though clearly intended by Moore, this generalization
may be questioned. Perhaps we have yet to consider the appropriate descrip-
tive definition. And when we do, perhaps the question of whether anything
satisfying the definiens is good will be closed. This is a fair complaint. As
such, Moore’s full case against the possibility of descriptively defining good
should be understood as a challenge: Give a descriptive definition of good
                                                                                                        
4 I am assuming that sentences express propositions relative to the context of utterance and
that the proposition expressed by a sentence is what is said, among other things, in utter-
ing that sentence in the given context. I am further assuming that propositions are the
primary bearers of truth and falsity, and are the objects of attitudes such as belief and
assertion. By the content of an expression, I mean that expression’s contribution to the
proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs (relative to the context of utter-
ance). The meaning of an expression is not, in general, its content. Thus the content of
context sensitive expressions, such as indexicals, can vary from context to context even
though their meaning remains constant. Though the meaning and content of context sen-
sitive expressions are distinct, I will make the simplifying assumption that the content of
context insensitive expressions just is their meaning. (For the most part we will ignore
context sensitivity.) Given these assumptions, the meaning of a context insensitive sen-
tence is the proposition that it expresses.
5 This is a version of an argument standardly attributed to Moore. I do not mean to be
engaged in Moorean exegesis here. (Indeed, there is room to doubt whether the argu-
ment standardly attributed to Moore is to be found in the Principia.) Rather, I mean only
to consider an argument, widely attributed to Moore, that has played an important role in
twentieth century metaethics.
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such that it is a closed question whether anything satisfying the definiens is
good or disavow analytic descriptivism.6
Let F be any descriptive predicate. We can reconstruct Moore’s argument
more generally as follows:
The Open Question Argument OQA
P1 If the universal closure of the biconditional:
x is good iff x is F
is a definition, then good and F are synonymous.
P2 Compositionality
Let e and e’ be expressions of the same grammatical category. If
S[...e...] and S[...e’...] are sentences free of quotation contexts and
S[...e...] is the result of substituting e in for an occurrence of e’ in
the sentence S[...e’...], then if e and e’ are synonymous, then
S[...e...] and S[...e’...] mean the same.
P3 The questions:
Q1 Granted that x is F, is x good?
Q2 Granted that x is good, is x good?
differ only in the substitution of good for an occurrence of F.
P4 If good and F are synonymous, then Q1 and Q2 mean the same.
From P3 & Compositionality
P5 If Q1 and Q2 mean the same, then if a competent speaker who
understands Q1 lacks sufficient evidence to know its answers (in
which case Q1 is open), then a competent speaker who understands
Q2 lacks sufficient evidence to know its answer (in which case Q2 is
open).
P6 Q1 is open.
                                                                                                        
6 Moore’s argument is general in another way. If it is a sound argument that there is no
descriptive definition of good, it is the basis of a sound argument that there is no descrip-
tive definition of any moral predicate. One need only issue the corresponding Moorean
challenge for every moral predicate. Moore, of course, maintains that right is definable,
but he denies that it is definable in purely descriptive idiom. The correct definition of
right essentially involves the predicate good:
An action is right in circumstances c iff it produces more good consequences
than any alternative action that is open to the agent in c.
OPEN QUESTIONS AND THE MANIFEST IMAGE    257
P7 Q2 is not open.
P8 Q1 and Q2 do not mean the same. From P5, P6 & P7 by modus
tollens
P9 Good and F are not synonymous. From P4 & P8 by modus tollens
C The universal closure of the biconditional:
x is good iff x is F
is not a definition. From P9 & P1 by modus tollens
So reconstructed, Moore’s open question argument is a close variant of
Frege’s puzzle. Frege (1892/1984) provides an apparent reductio of a co-
mmonsense view of the meanings of names:
Millianism
The meaning of a name is the object that it denotes.
Hesperus and Phosphorus are names for the same object, Venus. So if the
meaning of a name were the object that it denotes, then Hesperus and
Phosphorus must mean the same. But Frege believes that we can decisively
establish that Hesperus and Phosphorus are not synonyms.
Suppose the names Hesperus and Phosphorus were indeed synonymous.
Now consider the following sentence:
Hesperus is visible in the evening.
Frege observes that the ancient astronomers possessed sufficient evidence to
accept this sentence. But if Hesperus meant just the same as Phosphorus,
then we could always replace one with the other in any sentence without
changing that sentence’s meaning. So if the meaning of a name were the
object that it denotes, then the sentence:
Hesperus is visible in the evening.
would mean just the same as the sentence:
Phosphorus is visible in the evening.
But whereas the ancient astronomers possessed sufficient evidence to accept
the former sentence, they lacked sufficient evidence to accept the latter. So
these two sentences do not mean the same, and thus Hesperus is nonsyn-
onymous with Phosphorus. But if Hesperus and Phosphorus are non-
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synonymous despite denoting the same object, then the meaning of a name is
not the object that it denotes.
We can reconstruct Frege’s puzzle as the following argument:
Frege’s Puzzle FP
P1 If the meaning of a name is the object that it denotes, then if
Hesperus and Phosphorus denote the same object, then Hesperus
and Phosphorus are synonymous.
P2 Compositionality
Let e and e’ be expressions of the same grammatical category. If
S[...e...] and S[...e’...] are sentences free of quotation contexts and
S[...e...] is the result of substituting e in for an occurrence of e’ in
the sentence S[...e’...], then if e and e’ are synonymous, then
S[...e...] and S[...e’...] mean the same.
P3 The sentences:
S1 Hesperus is visible in the evening.
S2 Phosphorus is visible in the evening.
differ only in the substitution of Phosphorus for an occurrence of
Hesperus.
P4 If Hesperus and Phosphorus are synonymous, then S1 and S2
mean the same. From P5 & Compositionality
P5 If S1 and S2 mean the same, then if a competent speaker possesses
sufficient evidence in a context c to accept S1, then that speaker
possesses sufficient evidence in c to accept S2 as well.7
P6 Competent speakers possess sufficient evidence in c to accept S1.
P7 Competent speakers lack sufficient evidence in c to accept S2.
P8 S1 and S2 do not mean the same. From P5, P6 & P7 by modus
tollens
                                                                                                        
7 This premise represents but one way of formulating Frege’s puzzle. There are a number
of other premises that may be deployed instead. For an illuminating discussion of the
relations between these premises and the resulting versions of Frege’s puzzle see Thau
(2002).
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P9 Hesperus and Phosphorus are nonsynonymous. From P4 & P8 by
modus tollens
P10 Hesperus and Phosphorus denote the same object. Empirical
premise
C The meaning of a name is not the object that it denotes. From P1,
P9 & P10 by modus tollens
There are some striking parallels between OQA and FP. Both have as their
targets claims about a difference in meaning. Whereas OQA purports to estab-
lish that moral and descriptive predicates are nonsynonymous, FP purports to
establish that some codenoting names are nonsynonymous. Not only do these
arguments purport to establish a difference in meaning, but they also deploy
essentially the same premises. Both OQA and FP involve compositionality
as a premise. Moreover, each involves as a premise a principle linking an
epistemic feature of a sentence with its meaning. Thus, Moore assumes that
if two questions mean the same, then if a competent speaker’s understanding
of one question constitutes insufficient evidence to know its answer, then his
understanding of the other constitutes insufficient evidence to know its
answer. Likewise, Frege assumes that if two sentences mean the same, then
if a competent speaker possesses sufficient evidence to accept one sentence,
then he possesses sufficient evidence to accept the other. Moreover, given
certain meaning platonist assumptions, each of these principles are universal
instantiations of Leibniz’s law, the indiscernability of identicals:
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all properties p, if p is property of
x, then p is a property of y.8
Suppose that there are propositions and that the meaning of a context insensi-
tive sentence is the proposition that it expresses. Suppose further that evi-
dence is always evidence for the truth (or falsity) of some proposition—that
evidentiary relations obtain primarily among propositions and only deriva-
tively among the sentences that convey them. Suppose as well that in accept-
ing a sentence a competent speaker believes the proposition conveyed by that
sentence in the context of utterance. And suppose that, at least in this
instance, the proposition expressed is conveyed by the relevant utterance.
Given these assumptions, the Fregean premise that if two sentences mean the
same, then the evidence for the acceptance of one sentence is evidence for the
                                                                                                        
8 The consequences of dropping these assumptions will be discussed in section eight.
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acceptance of the other is a universal instantiation of Leibniz’s law (Salmon,
1986, 57).9 Specifically:
If the proposition expressed by S1 = the proposition expressed by
S2, then if the ancient astronomers possessing sufficient evidence to
believe it is a property of the proposition expressed by S1, then the
ancient astronomers possessing sufficient evidence to believe it is a
property of the proposition expressed by S2.
The same is true of the Moorean premise. Suppose that there are propositions
and that the meaning of a context insensitive question is the proposition that
it expresses. Suppose further that openness is primarily a feature of proposi-
tions and only derivatively a feature of the questions that convey them. And
suppose that, at least in this instance, the proposition expressed is conveyed
by the relevant utterance. Given these assumptions, the Moorean premise that
if two questions mean the same, then if one question is open then the other
question is open is itself a universal instantiation of Leibniz’s law. Specifi-
cally:
If the proposition expressed by Q1 = the proposition expressed by
Q2, then if being open is a property of the proposition expressed by
Q1, then being open is a property of the proposition expressed by
Q2.
Whereas there is as of yet no consensus concerning the soundness of FP,
there is widespread (if not universal) agreement that OQA is unsound.10 One
orthodox line of reasoning behind this verdict can be reconstructed as follows.
If OQA were sound, then the following semantic principle would be true:
Predicate Transparency
If it is possible for competent speakers to understand predicates F
and G  without thereby possessing sufficient evidence to know that
they apply to the same range of things, then F and G  are nonsyn-
onymous.
This principle, however, is false. Consider Kripke’s (1979/1988, p. 134) ex-
ample: Furze and gorse are normally regarded as synonyms. Indeed, even
Austin, who once entertained the hypothesis that there are no synonyms in
                                                                                                        
9 Though this is a common way of talking, it has not gone unquestioned. Thus Cartwright
(1971) has argued that Leibniz’s law should not be understood as a general principle
from which such instances may be derived; rather, there are a plurality of distinct indis-
cernability principles all of which are on a par. This would be fine with me if it were so.
10 Though contemporary nonfactualists such as Gibbard (1990) continue to endorse the
open question argument in one form or another.
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English, conceded that furze and gorse are synonymous and modified his
hypothesis accordingly—there are no synonyms in English except furze and
gorse. However, it is possible for a competent speaker of English to learn
furze and gorse normally, such that he perfectly understands these expres-
sions, and on separate occasions, and yet coherently wonder whether they
denote the same species or merely similar species. Such a speaker would
understand the expressions, furze and gorse, and not thereby know that they
apply to the same range of things, but furze and gorse are synonymous
nonetheless. Indeed, there are many examples in the literature of synonymous
expressions where it is possible for competent speakers to understand them
and yet fail to know that they are coextensive.11 Moreover, not all of these
examples involve natural kinds. Salmon (1989) argues that a competent
speaker of English could learn ketchup and catsup normally and separately
and yet coherently wonder whether they denote the same or merely similar
sauces. The meaning of an expression is not fully transparent to a competent
speaker that understands it. And insofar as OQA, if sound, implies otherwise
(at least for predicates), we should reject that argument as unsound.
This is something like the orthodox reasoning behind the verdict that
OQA is unsound.12 While there is widespread (if not universal) agreement
concerning the unsoundness of OQA, the likely unsoundness of FP is more
controversial. This should be puzzling. If I am right that OQA is a variant of
FP, then whatever reason there is to doubt the soundness of the former is
reason to doubt the soundness of the latter. Indeed, parallel reasoning would
constitute a defense of Millianism. Consider the corresponding thesis about
names:
Name Transparency
If it is possible for competent speakers to understand names a and b
without thereby possessing sufficient evidence to know that they
denote the same object, then a and b are nonsynonymous.
Let S[…b…] be the result of replacing an occurrence of name a in S[…a…]
with name b. If name transparency were false, then it would be plausible that
a competent speaker that understands a and b  could, without irrationality or
pragmatic incoherence, accept the sentence S[…a…] and reject the sentence
S[…b…] even though the names a and b  mean the same. Thus it would be
plausible that a competent speaker that understands Hesperus and Phospho-
                                                                                                        
11 See, inter alia, Rieber (1992), Salmon (1989, 1990), and Soames (1986). Relevant exam-
ples can be found in almost any of the literature on the paradox of analysis and Mates’
puzzle.
12 For representative statements of what I have been describing as the orthodox reasoning
see Boyd (1988), Putnam (1981, 206-7), and Smith (1986).
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rus could, without irrationality or pragmatic incoherence, accept Hesperus is
visible in the evening and reject Phosphorus is visible in the evening
even if Hesperus and Phosphorus meant the same. Notice that this, or
something very much like it, is the position defended by contemporary
Millians. What is puzzling, then, is the readiness of so many to deny the
transparency of the meanings of predicates and yet to insist on the transpar-
ency of the meanings of names.
It is more than a puzzle in the philosophy of language. The failure to
appreciate that OQA is a variant of FP has caused confusion in metaethics.
Consider the following example (we will discuss another, closely related
example in the next section). Consider, specifically, the following form of
Fregean naturalist. His naturalism consists in the claim that moral predicates
denote natural properties;13 indeed, they are codenoting with certain (complex)
natural predicates. His Fregeanism consists in the denial that moral predicates
are synonymous with any natural predicate. So, a moral predicate differs in
meaning from every natural predicate—even from the codenoting natural
predicate. (Compare Fregean naturalism to a widely accepted view about the
meaning and denotation of natural kind terms: Water and H2O differ in
meaning despite denoting the same natural kind.) One cannot coherently
endorse Fregean naturalism and accept the orthodox verdict concerning OQA:
Doing so would undermine one’s reason for denying that a moral predicate is
synonymous with the codenoting natural predicate. But the leading exponents
of the orthodox verdict, Boyd (1988), Putnam (1981), and Smith (1986) are
Fregean naturalists.
I have claimed that if OQA and FP were sound, then the semantic princi-
ples, predicate and name transparency, would be true. Moreover, I have sug-
gested that these principles are false. At most such considerations would es-
tablish that there is reason to doubt the soundness of OQA and FP. They do
not, however, fully establish the unsoundness of OQA and FP. To fully
establish their unsoundness, one needs to explain what is wrong with these
arguments. Establishing that OQA and FP are unsound involves explaining,
if they are invalid, why they are invalid; and explaining, if some of their
premises are false, which of their premises are false. But these explanations
have not been given. Moreover, the explanation of the unsoundness of OQA
and FP should be linked to the explanation of the failures of predicate and
name transparency. The present objection crucially turns on the thought that
if OQA and FP are sound then predicate and name transparency are true. So an
explanation of the unsoundness of OQA and FP should be the basis of an
explanation for the failures of predicate and name transparency. And again,
these latter explanations have not been given. While we have the beginnings
                                                                                                        
13 Natural properties are a subkind of descriptive properties and contrast with supernatural
properties.
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of a case against OQA and FP, the full case has yet to be given. We will be
in a better position to appreciate the unsoundness of OQA and FP and the
failures of predicate and name transparency as the discussion proceeds. The
explanation of the unsoundness of OQA and FP will be given in section six.
The explanation of the failures of predicate and name transparency will be
given in section seven.
2 Moore’s Case for Nonnaturalism
OQA purports to reveal something about the metaphysics of morals, but,
strictly speaking, the immediate conclusion of the argument is that no moral
predicate is synonymous with any descriptive predicate. On this basis, Moore
argues that moral properties are distinct from descriptive properties and so
differ in kind.
I have criticized OQA for its commitment to predicate transparency—for
involving the controversial assumption that anyone who understands two
synonymous predicates would thereby possess sufficient evidence to know
that they apply to the same range of things. But a more telling criticism is
that the metaphysical conclusion that Moore draws simply does not follow
from the claim that moral predicates are nonsynonymous with descriptive
predicates.
Consider, then, Moore’s case for nonnaturalism. The case for nonnatural-
ism has a positive and a negative component. According to nonnaturalism,
there are moral properties and no moral property is identical to any descrip-
tive property. Since there are moral properties and none are identical to any
descriptive property, moral properties must differ in kind from descriptive
properties—they must be nonnatural properties. It is important to recognize
the positive component of nonnaturalism. Someone might accept the claim
that no moral property is identical to any descriptive property for the trivial
reason that there are no moral properties. But nonnaturalism is not a species
of nonfactualism. The conclusion of OQA is supposed to form the basis of
an argument for the negative component of nonnaturalism—that moral prop-
erties are distinct from natural (or descriptive) properties. But how does
Moore move from the premise:
No moral predicate is synonymous with any descriptive predicate.
to the conclusion:
No moral property is identical to any descriptive property.
The argument is invalid as it stands. For all that has been said, goodness
might be a descriptive property even though good is nonsynonymous with
any descriptive predicate. Compare: George W. Bush is the president of the
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United States even though George W. Bush  and the president of the
United States differ in meaning.
According to the standard objection, in order to construct a valid argument,
Moore needs an extra premise linking predicate synonymy with property iden-
tity:
If predicates F and G  denote the same property, then F and G  are
synonymous.
But, the objection continues, this principle embodies a view of properties
now widely regarded as false.14 According to predicate nominalism, whenever
we have a meaningful predicate F we may harmlessly speak of the property of
being F .15 The transition is supposed to be as unproblematic as our unre-
flective transition from It is true that S  to It is a fact that S . Indeed, the
transition is underwritten by an a priori comprehension scheme—an a priori
specification of the existence of properties in terms of the meanings of
predicates. Moreover, according to predicate nominalism, properties are indi-
viduated by an equivalence relation on predicates. Specifically, two predicates
will denote the same property just in case they are synonymous. Indeed, this
is underwritten by an a priori abstraction principle—an a priori specification
of the identities of properties in terms of the equivalence relation of synon-
ymy on predicates. So according to predicate nominalism, the existence and
identity of properties is explained in terms of the meanings of predicates:
Predicate Nominalism
1 It is a priori that: The property of being F exists iff F is a meaning-
ful predicate.
2 It is a priori that: The property of being F = the property of being G
iff F and G are synonymous.
Predicate nominalism, however, faces a number of difficulties. According to
predicate nominalism, there will be at least as many properties as there are
predicates, but given the inevitable expressive limitations of language, the
number of properties must surely outstrip the number of available predi-
cates.16 Worse still, the comprehension scheme is incoherent. Consider the
                                                                                                        
14 See, inter alia, Brink (1989, ch. 6), and Horgan and Timmons (1992).
15 The terminology is Armstrong’s (1980).
16 How the predicate nominalist can account for this is a difficult matter. He could either
formulate the comprehension scheme in terms of possible predicates or in terms of tran-
scendent predicate types (transcendent types exist whether or not they have tokens).
Thus the predicate nominalist could claim that for every possible meaningful predicate
there will be a property or that for every (potentially meaningful) transcendent predicate
type there will be a corresponding property. As for the former option, one may well
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predicate non-self-instantiating. Is the property of being non-self-instan-
tiating itself non-self-instantiating? If the predicate nominalist does not suita-
bly restrict the transition from meaningful predicates to properties then a
variant of Russell’s paradox threatens. But once one imposes the relevant
restrictions on the comprehension scheme, predicate nominalism begins to be
less deliberately naïve and more controversial. Indeed if type restrictions were
imposed it would be a notational variant of Russell’s theory of propositional
functions. For these and related reasons predicate nominalism is now widely
regarded as false. And if the needed missing premise—that if two predicates
denote the same property, then they are synonymous—presupposes predicate
nominalism, then the resulting argument is unsound.
Unfortunately, the standard objection is off target. Moore’s argument does
not presuppose predicate nominalism, it presupposes:
Predicate Millianism
1 The meaning of a predicate F exists iff F denotes a property.
2 The meaning of a predicate F = the meaning of a predicate G  iff F
and G are codenoting.
Predicate Millianism entails the missing premise—after all, if there is noth-
ing more to the meaning of a predicate than the property it denotes, then if
two predicates denote the same property, then they are synonymous. More-
over, predicate nominalists are committed to predicate Millianism. If the exis-
tence and identity of properties a priori depends on the existence and identity
of predicate meanings, then no matter how finely predicate meanings are indi-
viduated, denoted properties will be individuated just as finely. That means
that there could be no codenoting predicates that differ in meaning. But one
can be a predicate Millian without being a predicate nominalist. A predicate
Millian can consistently deny that the existence and identity of properties a
priori depends on the existence and identity of predicate meanings. And if a
predicate Millian were to do so, then far from explaining properties in terms
of predicate meanings, he would be explaining predicate meanings in terms of
properties. The standard objection is wrong. The missing premise presup-
poses, not predicate nominalism, but predicate Millianism. So the likely fal-
sity of predicate nominalism does nothing to cast doubt on the truth of the
missing premise.
                                                                                                        
wonder whether the notion of a possible predicate is any clearer than the notion of a
property that it purports to explicate. The latter option, however, is especially unconge-
nial since types (whether of expressions or not) are properties and are thus precisely
what the predicate nominalist seeks to account for.
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While the standard objection fails, the fact that the argument presupposes
predicate Millianism highlights an important difficulty that we have over-
looked so far. No one could coherently accept OQA as sound and reason from
the nonsynonymy of predicates to the distinctness of the properties they
denote. In the last section I argued that OQA is a variant of FP. But if OQA
is a variant of FP, then OQA is at least the basis of an argument for there
being more to the meaning of a predicate than the property it denotes.17
According to the Fregean, two predicates can denote the same property and yet
differ in meaning. But if codenoting predicates can differ in meaning, there is
no valid argument from the nonsynonymy of predicates to the distinctness of
the properties they denote. Just because good and F differ in meaning it
would not follow that they differ in denotation. Good and F might denote the
same descriptive property despite differing in meaning (by denoting the same
property under distinct modes of presentations). So if OQA is a variant of
FP, then no one who accepts the soundness of OQA could coherently reason
from moral predicates being nonsynonymous with descriptive predicates to
their differing in denotation. If Moore really did reason from the conclusion of
OQA to the negative component of nonnaturalism, then by his own lights,
this argument fails.18
3 Nonreductive Descriptivism and Nonnaturalism
There is a further problem. Forget, for a moment, that the argument for
nonaturalism and OQA are part of the same package. Consider the argument
for the negative component of nonnaturalism in isolation from OQA. Even if
we assume predicate Millianism, the argument that moral properties are dis-
tinct from descriptive properties fails. By contraposition the missing premise
is equivalent to:
                                                                                                        
17 Predicate Fregeanism is motivated by a reductio of predicate Millianism. Furze and
gorse denote the same species. If predicate Millianism were true, then furze and gorse
must mean the same. But the Fregean believes (pace Austin!) that we can decisively
establish that furze and gorse are not synonyms. Suppose the predicates furze and gorse
were indeed synonymous. If furze meant just the same as gorse, then we could always
replace one with the other in any sentence without changing that sentence’s meaning. So
the question:
Granted that x is a furze, is x a gorse?
would mean just the same as the question:
Granted that x is a furze, is x a furze?
But whereas it is perfectly intelligible to ask the former question, it is absurd to ask the
latter. So these two questions do not mean the same, and thus furze is nonsynonymous
with gorse. Since furze and gorse are nonsynonymous despite denoting the same spe-
cies, the meaning of a predicate is not the property it denotes.
18 This suggests that it is perhaps a mistake to attribute to Moore the metalinguistic version
of the open question argument. In section four, we will consider a reformulation of the
open question argument in terms of Leibniz’s law.
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If F and G are nonsynonymous, then F and G  denote distinct prop-
erties.
But from this and the premise:
No moral predicate is synonymous with any descriptive predicate.
all we are entitled to conclude is:
No property denoted by a moral predicate is identical to any property
denoted by a descriptive predicate.
But the negative component of nonnaturalism is a different claim:
No moral property is identical to any descriptive property.
From the mere fact that distinct kinds of predicates differ in denotation, it
does not follow that the denoted properties themselves differ in kind. Indeed,
the contrary supposition involves a kind of use/mention mistake: It mistakes
a claim about representations (that distinct kinds of predicates differ in denota-
tion) for a claim about what they represent (that the distinct denoted proper-
ties themselves differ in kind).
The present objection turns on the logical possibility of nonreductive
descriptivism—of normative predicates denoting descriptive properties not
denoted by any descriptive predicate. The thought is that one could discover
that a normative predicate denotes a descriptive property not by identifying
the property it denotes with the denotation of a descriptive predicate, but by
simply discovering that the property it denotes is descriptive. But is this
logical possibility metaphysically possible?
Perhaps, not. Nonreductive descriptivism presupposes that the metaphysi-
cal distinction between normative and descriptive properties is understood
independently of the linguistic distinction between normative and descriptive
predicates. After all, if a normative predicate can denote a descriptive property
not denoted by any descriptive predicate, then the notion of a descriptive
property must be understood independently of descriptive predicates. But
while we have some idea of what the higher-order properties of normative
properties might be, we have no idea what the higher-order properties of
descriptive properties are. (Unless, of course, descriptive just means non-
normative.) And if we have no idea what the higher-order properties of
descriptive properties are, then how could we ever discover that the denotation
of a normative predicate is a descriptive property?19
                                                                                                        
19 That we lack a positive conception of descriptive properties can be masked by conflating
two senses of natural. Most contemporary descriptivists are naturalists. Recall (note thir-
teen), natural properties are a subclass of descriptive properties and contrast with super-
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Notice that this is not just a problem for nonreductive descriptivism. It is
equally a problem for the nonnaturalist. The nonnaturalist claims that norma-
tive properties differ in kind from descriptive properties. But if we have no
idea what the higher-order properties of descriptive properties are, then we
have no idea of the content of this denial. We would not know what norma-
tive properties differ in kind from. Unless we have some positive conception
of what descriptive properties are, the distinction between nonreductive
descriptivism and nonnaturalism collapses.
Perhaps these difficulties tell against the assumption that the metaphysical
distinction between normative and descriptive properties is basic. There are
two possible relationships between the metaphysical and linguistic distinc-
tions. On the one hand, one could take the metaphysical distinction as basic
and explain the linguistic distinction in terms of it. Thus, one might claim
that a predicate is normative because it denotes a normative property; and
that a predicate is descriptive because  it denotes a descriptive property. On
the other hand, one might take the linguistic distinction as basic and explain
the metaphysical distinction in terms of it. Thus, one might claim that a
property is normative because  a normative predicate denotes it; and that a
property is descriptive because a descriptive predicate denotes it. Notice if we
instead took the linguistic distinction as basic, then we would have the basis
of a valid argument for the negative component of nonnaturalism. If a
property is descriptive because a descriptive predicate denotes it, then
establishing that no normative predicate is codesignative with any descriptive
predicate is sufficient to establish that no normative predicate denotes a
descriptive property. And since normative properties just are the properties
denoted by normative predicates, it would follow that no normative property
is identical with any descriptive property.
Unfortunately, taking the linguistic distinction as basic would result in
too quick an argument for the negative component of nonnaturalism. Indeed
Moore’s argument would be unnecessary. If a property is normative or
descriptive because it is denoted by a normative or a descriptive predicate,
then a property is only normative or descriptive if it is denoted by a norma-
tive or a descriptive predicate. But as the distinction between normative and
descriptive predicates constitutes a partition, it would follow that the distinc-
tion between normative and descriptive properties would itself constitute a
                                                                                                        
natural properties. Normative naturalism claims that normative properties are themselves
a subkind of natural properties. But there is a distinct sense of naturalism that is a form of
scientism. According to this latter sense, natural properties are the properties postulated
by (or explained in terms of) the natural sciences. We have some idea what the higher-
order properties of natural properties in this latter sense are. (But see Crane and Mellor,
1990.) So, if we are not careful to distinguish these senses of natural, this fact can mis-
lead us into thinking that we have some idea what the higher-order properties of natural
properties in the former sense are (apart from being nonsupernatural).
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partition. But that would rule out in advance the possibility of moral descrip-
tivism.
4 The Open Question Argument and Leibniz’s Law
The difficulties with OQA are due to the fact that the argument is explicitly
metalinguistic. The immediate conclusion of the argument is that no moral
predicate is synonymous with any descriptive predicate. And it is precisely
this feature of Moore’s argument that was the source of our difficulties. For,
so formulated, the argument relies on a controversial semantic principle—that
any competent speaker that understands two synonymous predicates would
thereby possess sufficient evidence to know that they apply to the same range
of things. Moreover, as we have seen, there is no direct entailment from
moral predicates being nonsynonymous with descriptive predicates to
Moore’s metaphysical conclusion. But does not Moore himself insist on the
irrelevance of verbal definition to moral philosophy? And does he not do so,
in part, because verbal definitions have a linguistic subject matter whereas
analytic definitions concern the nature of the property in question? This sug-
gests that it was, perhaps, a mistake to attribute to Moore a metalinguistic
formulation of the open question argument.20
Perhaps, then, the open question argument should be formulated, not in
terms of compositionality, but, rather, in terms of Leibniz’s law, the indis-
cernibility of identicals:
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all properties p, if p is a property
of x, then p is a property of y.
So formulated, the argument would have the advantage of being directly about
the properties in question rather than being about their linguistic surro-
gates—the predicates that denote them.21
Recall the problem in distinguishing nonreductive descriptivism from
nonnaturalism was due to our lacking a positive conception of what descrip-
tive properties are. If we have no idea what the higher-order properties of
descriptive properties are, then we have no way of deciding whether normative
properties are distinct in kind from descriptive properties or are merely a dis-
tinct subkind of descriptive property. If this is an approximately correct
description of our epistemic situation, then it is an exaggeration to say that
we don’t know any of the higher-order properties of descriptive properties.
                                                                                                        
20 Though perhaps only on the assumption that Moore’s explicit recognition that it is a mis-
take to confuse use with mention is evidence that he is not disposed to make this mistake.
This assumption is questionable. One can explicitly recognize that it is a mistake not to
bend one’s knees when swinging a gold club and yet still be disposed to swing stiff-
kneed. But why should bad intellectual habits be any different from bad physical habits?
21 Indeed, the version of the open question argument as deployed in Moore’s (1912) Ethics,
can only be reconstructed in terms of Leibniz’s law.
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Descriptive properties would have certain epistemic, higher-order properties.
Specifically, descriptive properties would have the higher-order property of it
being an open question whether any descriptive property is normative. The
reformulation of the open question argument in terms of Leibniz’s law cru-
cially exploits this kind of epistemic, higher-order property:
The Reformulated Open Question Argument OQALL
P1 Leibniz’s law
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all properties p, if p is a property
of x, then p is a property of y.
P2 If F-ness = goodness, then for all properties p, if p is a property of
F-ness, then p is a property of goodness. From Leibniz’s law by
universal instantiation
P3 F-ness has the higher-order property that it is an open question
whether everything that instantiates it is good.
P4 Goodness does not have the higher-order property that it is an open
question whether everything that instantiates it is good.
C F-ness ¹ goodness. From P2-P4 by modus tollens
Just like the prior reconstruction, OQALL is perfectly general. If it is a sound
argument that goodness is not identical to some particular descriptive prop-
erty (such as being what we desire to desire) then it is the basis of a sound
argument that goodness is not identical to any descriptive property. One need
only run the argument for every descriptive property. OQALL is general in
another way as well. If it is the basis of a sound argument that goodness is
not identical to any descriptive property, it is the basis of a sound argument
that no moral property is identical to any descriptive property. One need only
run the argument for every moral property and every descriptive property.
Given this, OQALL is a direct argument for the negative component of non-
naturalism—that no moral property is identical to any descriptive property.
Since OQALL provides a direct argument for the negative component of non-
naturalism, it avoids the difficulties of trying to establish this metaphysical
conclusion on the basis of semantic premises. As such, OQALL might appear
to be a better argument than the original reconstruction. But is it sound?
One might object to OQALL that it is an instance of the familiar failure of
Leibniz’s law. Consider the analogous argument that Arnauld (1641/1984)
attributes to Descartes:
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An Argument for Mind/Body Dualism
P1 Leibniz’s law
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all properties p, if p is a property
of x, then p is a property of y.
P2 If my body = my mind, then for all properties p, if p is a property of
my body, then p is a property of my mind. From Leibniz’s law by
universal instantiation
P3 Being doubtful is a property of my body.
P4 Being doubtful is not a property of my mind.
C My body ¹ my mind. From P2-P4 by modus tollens
This argument is obviously unsound. And some have been tempted to attrib-
ute the unsoundness of this argument to the illicit application of Leibniz’s
law. Specifically, it is sometimes maintained that Leibniz’s law should be
restricted to nonintensional properties.22 According to this line of objection,
the unrestricted version of Leibniz’s law as it occurs in P3 is false, and,
hence, the argument is unsound. But if we reformulate Leibniz’s law with the
operative restriction:
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all nonintensional properties p, if
p is a property of x, then p is a property of y.
the resulting argument is invalid, since the property of being doubtful is an
intensional property. If that’s right, then OQALL is unsound as well since it
involves as a premise the unrestricted version of Leibniz’s law. But if OQALL
is formulated in terms of the restricted version of Leibniz’s law, then it is
invalid. Just as the property of being doubtful is an intensional property, so
is the higher-order property of being an open question whether everything that
instantiates it is good.
This is a tissue of confusion. First of all, it is unclear how even to give
content to the restricted version of Leibniz’s law. After all what could an
                                                                                                        
22 The alleged failures of Leibniz’s law purport to establish its intensionality. But the inten-
sionality of Leibniz’s law is certainly not due to its being explicitly formulated in inten-
sional idiom. Leibniz’s law is formulated in the idiom of first-order logic and that is
extensional if anything is. Rather, the alleged intensionality of Leibniz’s law derives from
its quantifiers purportedly ranging over special intensional entities—intensional proper-
ties. This is a generalization of the explanation of the intensionality of modality in terms
of quantification over intensional entities—in this case, possible worlds. Subsequent dis-
cussion suggests that this pattern of explanation is bankrupt.
272    MARK ELI KALDERON
intensional property be if not a property that would violate Leibniz’s law.
But if that’s what an intensional property is, then restricting Leibniz’s law to
nonintensional properties is devoid of content. One cannot both characterize
an intensional property as a property that would falsify the unrestricted ver-
sion of Leibniz’s law and formulate Leibniz’s law in terms of a restriction to
nonintensional properties. That’s like saying that this principle is true of all
properties except those properties that would falsify this principle. But if
intensional properties cannot be characterized as properties that would violate
Leibniz’s law, how else are they to be characterized? It is utterly unclear
what, in this context, an intensional property could be. We will return to this
issue later.
Even if content could be given to the restricted version of Leibniz’s law,
there is still a problem. The present objection is motivated, in no small part,
by what is taken to be the standard Fregean response to Frege’s puzzle. But
the standard Fregean response does not support the claim that there are fail-
ures of Leibniz’s law. If anything, the standard Fregean response is a vindica-
tion of Leibniz’s law in the face of its apparent failure.
Earlier, I noted that the OQA is analogous to FP. There is a further anal-
ogy that is presently relevant, namely, that each admits of a variant formula-
tion in terms of Leibniz’s law. Specifically, Frege’s puzzle can be formulated
as follows:
Frege’s Puzzle Reformulated FPLL
P1 Leibniz’s law
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all properties p, if p is a property
of x, then p is a property of y.
P2 If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then for all properties p, if p is a prop-
erty of Hesperus, then p is a property of Phosphorus. From Leib-
niz’s law by universal instantiation
P3 Hesperus has the property that the ancient astronomers believed that
it is visible in the evening.
P4 Phosphorus does not have the property that the ancient astronomers
believed that it is visible in the evening.
C Hesperus ¹ Phosphorus. From P2-P4 by modus tollens23
                                                                                                        
23 There is, however, an important disanlogy between OQALL and FPLL. Whereas, it is
possible to accept OQALL as sound it is not possible to accept FPLL as sound. FPLL is after
all an argument to the incredible conclusion that Venus is not identical to itself. The anal-
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The relevant transitions are apparently valid, but we are led by means of them
to the incredible conclusion that Venus is not identical to itself. We have a
puzzle, and apparently the only way out of it is to deny one of the premises.
Initially it might appear that Leibniz’s law is the culprit. But the standard
Fregean response to this puzzle is not to deny this premise. Indeed, in order
to vindicate Leibniz’s law in the face of its apparent failure, they postulate a
range of special entities, modes of presentations, and argue that what reflec-
tion on the puzzle establishes is not that Venus is distinct from itself; but,
rather, that there are distinct modes of presentations of Venus.24 Strictly
speaking, the ancient astronomers belief did not ascribe a property, being
visible in the evening, to an object Venus; rather, their belief ascribes a prop-
erty to Venus under a mode of presentation. The ancient astronomers
believed of Venus under a particular mode of presentation MPHesperus that it is
visible in the evening, and it is only under a distinct mode of presentation
MPPhosphorus that the ancient astronomers failed to believe that Venus is visible
in the evening. Moreover, the only reason for maintaining that the relevant
modes of presentation are distinct is via an application of Leibniz’s law. Spe-
cifically, there is a mode of presentation MPHesperus that has the property that
under it the ancient astronomers believed of Venus that it is visible in the
evening. There is a mode of presentation MPPhosphorus that does not have the
property that under it the ancient astronomers believed of Venus that it is
visible in the evening. Given Leibniz’s law, it follows that MPHesperus and
MPPhosphorus are distinct modes of presentation of Venus.
I suspect that the conviction that the standard Fregean response shows that
there are failures of Leibniz’s law is due to a conflation. Specifically, Leib-
niz’s law:
For all x and y, if x = y, then for all properties p, if p is a property
of x, then p is a property of y.
is conflated with a superficially similar principle:
Substitutivity
All instances of the scheme:
If x = y, then if S[…x…] then S[…y…]
                                                                                                        
ogy would restored if we had considered, instead, an argument to the conclusion that the
belief that Hesperus is visible in the evening is distinct from the belief that Phosphorus is
visible in the evening.
24 There is an analogy with Frege’s response to the puzzle formulated in terms of composi-
tionality. Notice that Leibniz’s law plays the role compositionality plays in the original
formulation of the puzzle. And Frege himself is explicit that the postulation of modes of
presentations is required to vindicate compositonality in the face of apparent counterex-
amples to that principle. For useful discussion see Burge (1986).
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are true (where x and y  are schematic letter whose permissible sub-
stituends are names and the sentential matrices, S[…x…] and
S[…y…], are free from quotation contexts).
At first glance, substitutivity can seem to be a notational variant of Leibniz’s
law, at least given certain idealizations. Suppose that every object has a
name, and every property a (possibly complex) predicate, that there are no
empty names or predicates, and no context sensitivity. Whereas Leibniz’s law
is formulated in the material mode, substitutivity is formulated in the formal
mode. And given our assumptions, they can seem to be equivalent.
But whereas the former principle is incontrovertible—the indiscernibility
of identicals is, after all, plausibly constitutive of both the identity relation
and being a property—the latter principle is controversial. Notice the latter
principle licenses the substitution of codesignative singular terms salva veri-
tate—even in propositional attitude constructions.25 And what the standard
Fregean response casts doubt on is precisely this. For suppose that associated
with competent speakers’ use of the name Hesperus is a mode of presenta-
tion, MPHesperus, and associated with competent speakers’ use of the name
Phosphorus is a distinct mode of presentation, MPPhosphorus. Suppose further
that the ancient astronomers believed of Venus under MPHesperus that it is visi-
ble in the evening but failed to believe of Venus under MPPhosphorus that it is
visible in the evening. Suppose further that the truth of a belief ascription is
sensitive to the modes of presentations associated with the names used in the
that-clause. Then the following instance of substitutivity:
If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then if the ancient astronomers believed
that Hesperus is visible in the evening, then the ancient astronomers
believed that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.
is false. What the standard Fregean response casts doubt on is not Leibniz’s
law but substitutivity. And it is only by unwittingly vacillating between the
two that one could think otherwise.26
The distinction between Leibniz’s law and substitutivity is relevant, as
well, to the characterization of intensional properties. Given substitutivity,
we can characterize a notion of an intensional predicate. Specifically, an
intensional predicate is any sentential matrix that occurs in a false instance of
substitutivity. Potential examples of intensional predicates include: i s
doubtful, is an open question whether everything that has it is good,
                                                                                                        
25 Substitutivity should thus be distinguished from compositionality. Whereas substitutivity
licenses the substitution of codesignative names salva veritate, compositionality licenses
the substitution of synonymous expressions salva significatione.
26 Cartwright (1971/1987) makes this point. For useful related discussion see Richard (1990,
ch. 4.1), and Salmon (1986, ch. 4).
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etc. An intensional property can then be characterized as a property denoted by
an intensional predicate.
We are now in a position to see clearly the precise confusion involved in
the suggestion that Leibniz’s law should be retricted to intensional properties.
It is only by mistaking substitutivity for Leibniz’s law that one is led to
believe that there are failures of Leibniz’s law. But in proposing a nontrivial
restriction on Leibniz’s law (specifically, that the principle should be
restricted to intensional properties), an intensional property cannot be charac-
terized as a property that violates Leibniz’s law. Rather, it must be under-
stood as a property denoted by an intensional predicate where intensional
predicates are characterized in terms of the failure of the (implicitly, distinct)
principle, substitutivity. The apparent plausibility of the suggestion depends
on the impossible—that Leibniz’s law and substitutivity are simultaneously
the same, yet distinct.
Substitutivity is a principle formulated in the formal mode—it is a meta-
linguistic principle. Leibniz’s law is a principle formulated in the material
mode—it is an objectual principle. Mistaking substitutivity for Leibniz’s law
is a kind of use/mention mistake—involving, as it does, mistaking a meta-
linguistic principle for an objectual principle. More than that, this mistake
masks (and perhaps makes possible) an important de re/de dicto conflation.
Notice that false instances of substitutivity such as:
If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then if the ancient astronomers believed
that Hesperus is visible in the evening, then the ancient astronomers
believed that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.
are de dicto claims. In contrast, the corresponding universal instantiations of
Leibniz’s law such as:
If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then Hesperus has the property that the
ancient astronomers believed that it is visible in the evening, then
Phosphorus has the property that the ancient astronomers believed
that it is visible in the evening.
are de re claims. So in mistaking substitutivity for Leibniz’s law, one is led
to mistake a false instance of substitutivity for a failure of Leibniz’s law; and
so to mistake a de dicto claim for a de re claim.
5 The Real Problem: Mistaking De Dicto Claims for De Re Claims
The real problem with the OQALL is not that it involves a failure of Leib-
niz’s law. (How could it?) Rather, it provides one with no reason to believe
its conclusion—a fact that can be masked by a de re/de dicto confusion. Let
me explain.
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Familarly, that-clauses can give rise to de re/de dicto ambiguities. Con-
sider the following: Edgar has released Bernice’s rabbit from its pen. Bernice
is understandably upset about her missing rabbit. Suppose someone were to
utter the following:
Bernice believes that Edgar is a bad person.
This utterance is ambiguous—it might be used to convey one of two propo-
sitions. The speaker might be ascribing to Bernice a de re  belief about
Edgar—that Bernice believes of Edgar that he is a bad person. But suppose it
is presupposed in the conversational context that Edgar is the one who
released the rabbit but Bernice does not know this. Then the utterance might
be used to ascribe a de dicto belief to Bernice—that whoever released her
rabbit from its pen is a bad person.
Just as that-clauses can give rise to de re/de dicto ambiguities, so too
can whether-clauses. Suppose, instead, that the speaker utters the following:
Bernice wonders whether Edgar is a bad person.
As before, this utterance is ambiguous—it might be used to convey one of
two propositions. The speaker might be ascribing a de re  attitude to Ber-
nice—that Bernice wonders of Edgar whether he is a bad person. But suppose
it is presupposed in the conversational context that Edgar is the one who
released the rabbit but Bernice does not know this. Then the utterance might
be used to ascribe a de dicto attitude to Bernice—that Bernice wonders
whether whoever released her rabbit from its pen is a bad person.
Now consider the following utterance:
It is an open question whether everything that instantiates F-ness is
good.
Once again, this utterance is ambiguous—it might be used to convey one of
two propositions. The speaker might be making a de re  claim—that F-ness
is such that it is an open question of it whether everything that instantiates it
is good. But the speaker might be making a de dicto claim—that it is an
open question whether everything that instantiates F-ness is good.
Recall that the conclusion of OQALL is that F-ness and goodness are dis-
tinct properties. The argument purports to establish that they are distinct by
claiming that F-ness has a higher-order property that goodness lacks. Specifi-
cally, whereas F-ness has the higher-order property that it is an open question
whether everything that instantiates it is good, goodness lacks this higher-
order property. By Leibniz’s law, F-ness and goodness must be distinct prop-
erties.
OPEN QUESTIONS AND THE MANIFEST IMAGE    277
It should be clear that the premises that F-ness has a higher-order property
and that goodness lacks this higher-order property must be de re claims about
these properties in order for the argument to be valid. The conclusion, that F-
ness and goodness are distinct properties, is supposed to follow from these
premises and the universal instantiation of Leibniz’s law:
If F-ness = goodness, then for all properties p, if p is a property of
F-ness, then p is a property of goodness.
But this is a de re claim. The universal instantiation claims of F-ness and of
goodness that if they are identical, then whatever is a higher-order property of
F-ness is a higher-order property of goodness. But as the universal instantia-
tion is a de re claim, the conclusion will only validly follow if the premises
themselves are understood as de re claims. Indeed, if there was anything to
the thought that Leibniz’s law should be restricted to nonintensional proper-
ties, it is just the confused recognition of this fact: That the distinctness of
two things will not validly follow from Leibniz’s law if the relevant property
ascriptions are de dicto claims. It is not that the unrestricted version of Leib-
niz’s law is false; rather, only that conclusions about nonidentity only validly
follow from Leibniz’s law given the relevant de re premises.
But now there is a problem. The most that Moorean reflection could estab-
lish is the de dicto claim:
It is an open question whether everything that instantiates F-ness is
good.
But what’s required for the validity of the argument is the truth of the corre-
sponding de re claim:
F-ness is such that it is an open question of it whether everything
that instantiates it is good.
But there is no reason to believe the de re premise without antecedently
believing that F-ness is distinct from goodness. After all, if you believe of F-
ness that it is goodness, then it will not be an open question of F-ness
whether everything that instantiates it is good. So, if one is initially agnostic
about the conclusion of OQALL—if one is agnostic about F-ness being good-
ness—one should be agnostic about F-ness being such that it is an open
question of it whether everything that instantiates it is good. But if that’s
right, then OQALL provides no positive reason for believing its conclusion.
Any appearance to the contrary is due to mistaking the de dicto claim—that
it is an open question whether everything that instantiates F-ness is
good—for the corresponding de re  claim—that F-ness is such that it is an
open question of it whether everything that instantiates it is good.
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The formulation of Frege’s puzzle in terms of Leibniz’s law, FPLL, is
subject to a similar diagnosis. Recall that the conclusion of FPLL is that
Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects. The argument purports to
establish that they are distinct by claiming that Hesperus has a property that
Phosphorus lacks. Specifically, whereas Hesperus has the property that the
ancient astronomers believed that it is visible in the evening, Phosphorus
lacks this property. By Leibniz’s law, Hesperus and Phosphorus must be
distinct objects.
It should be clear that the premises that Hesperus has some property and
that Phosphorus lacks this property must be de re claims in order for the
argument to be valid. The conclusion, that Hesperus and Phosphorus are dis-
tinct, is supposed to follow from these premises and the following universal
instantiation of Leibniz’s law:
If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then for all properties p, if p is a prop-
erty of Hesperus, then p is a property of Phosphorus.
But this is a de re claim. The universal instantiation claims of Hesperus and
of Phosphorus that if they are identical, then whatever is a property of Hespe-
rus is a property of Phosphorus. But as the universal instantiation is a de re
claim, the conclusion will only validly follow if the premises themselves are
understood as de re claims.
But now, as before, there is a problem. The most that reflection on astro-
nomical ignorance could establish is the truth of the de dicto claim:
The ancient astronomers did not believe that Phosphorus is visible
in the evening.
But what’s required for the validity of the relevant transition is the truth of
the corresponding de re claim:
The ancient astronomers did not believe of Phosphorus that it is
visible in the evening.
But, it is overwhelmingly plausible that this claim is false. When the ancient
astronomers looked into the night sky and saw Venus, they believed of it that
it is visible in the evening. But this is precisely what the corresponding de re
claim denies. Any appearance to the contrary is due to mistaking the de dicto
claim—that the ancient astronomers did not believe that Phosphorus is visi-
ble in the evening—for the corresponding de re  claim—that the ancient
astronomers did not believe of Phosphorus that it is visible in the evening.
The open question argument and Frege’s puzzle, when formulated in terms
of Leibniz’s law, are subject to the same diagnosis. In each case, reflection on
the relevant epistemic circumstances establishes at most the truth of a de
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dicto claim; but the validity of these arguments requires that the relevant
premises be understood as de re claims. However, we should not believe the
corresponding de re claims—either because we have no reason to believe
them or because we have positive reason to deny them. But if we should not
believe the de re premises of these arguments, then neither should we believe
their conclusions.
The apparent soundness of OQALL and the puzzling character of FPLL each
involves mistaking a de dicto claim for a de re claim. If we are prone to
mistake substitutivity for Leibniz’s law, this is perfectly explicable. In mis-
taking substitutivity for Leibniz’s law, one is led to mistake instances of
substitutivity for universal instantiations of Leibniz’s law. But whereas uni-
versal instantiations of Leibniz’s law are de re claims, instances of substitu-
tivity need not be. Moreover, if there is unclarity about the content of the
major premise, there will be a corresponding unclarity about the contents of
the minor premises. So if the major premises of OQALL and FPLL are univer-
sal instantiations of Leibniz’s law but are mistaken for instances of substitu-
tivity, then understanding the minor premises as true de dicto claims will
result in the illusory soundness of these arguments.
6 The Metalinguistic Formulations Again
In section one I argued that if OQA and FP are sound, then the semantic prin-
ciples, predicate and name transparency, are true. I suggested that these prin-
ciples are false, and provisionally concluded that OQA and FP are unsound.
Completing the case requires two things: First, one needs to explain why
they are invalid, if they are; and explain which of their premises are false, if
any are. Second, the explanation of the unsoundness of these arguments
should be linked to the failures of predicate and name transparency. In this
section, I will explain why OQA and FP are unsound. In the following sec-
tion, I will explain the failures of predicate and name transparency.
Recall, OQA crucially involves a premise linking an epistemic feature of
a question with its meaning. Specifically, OQA involved the premise:
If Q1 and Q2 mean the same, then if a competent speaker who
understands the meaning of Q1 lacks sufficient evidence to know its
answer, then a competent speaker who understands Q2 lacks suffi-
cient evidence to know its answer.
(where Q1 and Q2 are the questions: Granted that x is F, is x good? and
Granted that x is good, is x good?). Moreover, I argued that, given certain
plausible assumptions, this is a universal instantiation of Leibniz’s law:
If the proposition expressed by Q1 = the proposition expressed by
Q2, then if being open is a property of the proposition expressed by
280    MARK ELI KALDERON
Q1, then being open is a property of the proposition expressed by
Q2.
The intermediate conclusion of OQA is that the questions:
Q1 Granted that x is F, is x good?
Q2 Granted that x is good, is x good?
differ in meaning and, hence, express distinct propositions. The argument
purports to establish that they express distinct propositions by claiming that
the proposition expressed by Q1 has a property that the proposition expressed
by Q2 lacks. Specifically, whereas the proposition expressed by Q1  has the
property of being open, the proposition expressed by Q2  lacks this property.
By Leibniz’s law, the propositions expressed by Q1 and Q2  must be distinct
propositions.
It might be true that utterances of Granted that x is F, is x good?
normally convey an open proposition. But in order for the argument to be
valid, the open proposition conveyed by this question must be the proposi-
tion expressed by it. After all, the relevant universal instantiation of Leib-
niz’s law is a claim about the propositions expressed  by these questions. So
if the open proposition conveyed by Granted that x is F, is x good? is not
the proposition expressed, then we cannot validly conclude that the
proposition expressed by i t is distinct from the proposition expressed by
Granted that x is good, is x good?
According to the descriptivist, F and good denote the same descriptive
property. Suppose F is the predicate what we desire to desire. If what we
desire to desire is identical to goodness and there is nothing more to the
meaning of a predicate than the property it denotes, then what we desire to
desire and good must be synonymous. Thus by compositionality:
Granted that x is what we desire to desire, is x good?
means the same as:
Granted that x is good, is x good?
The meaning of this question, the proposition that it expresses, is a singular
query about what we desire to desire—it asks of what we desire to desire
whether everything that instantiates it is good. Indeed it is the very same sin-
gular query that Granted that x is good, is x good? expresses. Though the
question Granted that x is what we desire to desire, is x good? expresses
a singular query, its utterance may pose some other query. The Moorean
insight is that utterances of this question normally convey a descriptive
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query—say, whether everything that instantiates the property of being the
object of a psychological attitude with such-and-such a functional role is
good. The Moorean also correctly observes that this descriptive query is open.
From these two observations it follows that the utterance of Granted that x
is what we desire to desire, is x good? conveys an open descriptive query.
But by hypothesis, the proposition expressed by Granted that x is what we
desire to desire, is x good? is a singular query. Since the proposition
conveyed is a descriptive query, it must be distinct from the proposition
expressed. But if the proposition conveyed by Granted that x is what we
desire to desire, is x good? (the open proposition) is not the proposition
expressed, then we cannot validly conclude that the proposition expressed by
this question is distinct from the proposition expressed by Granted that x is
good, is x good?.
The problem with OQA then is this. A crucial intermediate conclusion of
OQA is that the questions:
Q1 Granted that x is F, is x good?
Q2 Granted that x is good, is x good?
differ in meaning and, hence, express distinct propositions. The subargument
purports to establish that they express distinct propositions by claiming that
the proposition expressed by Q1 has a property that the proposition expressed
by Q2 lacks. Specifically, whereas the proposition expressed by Q1 has the
property of being open, the proposition expressed by Q2 lacks this property.
But this former claim has not been established. By hypothesis, the proposi-
tion expressed by Q1 is a singular query about F-ness—it asks of F-ness
whether everything that instantiates it is good. Moreover, if one is agnostic
about F-ness being goodness, one should be agnostic about it being an open
question of F-ness whether everything that instantiates it is good. The most
that has been established is that a descriptive query is open—that it is an
open question whether everything that instantiates some property presented
under the descriptive mode of presentation, MPF-ness, is good. But as the
descriptive query is a proposition distinct from the proposition expressed by
Q1, this goes nowhere towards showing that the proposition expressed by
this question is distinct from the proposition expressed by Q2.
Recall, FP itself crucially involved a premise linking an epistemic feature
of a sentence with its meaning. Specifically FP involved the premise:
If S1 and S2 mean the same, then if a competent speaker possesses
sufficient evidence to accept S1, then the speaker possesses suffi-
cient evidence to accept S2 as well.
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(where S1 and S2 are the sentences: Hesperus is visible in the evening and
Phosphorus is visible in the evening). Moreover, I argued that, given
certain plausible assumptions, this is a universal instantiation of Leibniz’s
law:
If the proposition expressed by S1 = the proposition expressed by
S2, then if having sufficient evidence in c to believe it is a property
of the proposition expressed by S1, then having sufficient evidence
in c to believe it is a property of the proposition expressed by S2.
The intermediate conclusion of FP is that:
S1 Hesperus is visible in the evening
S2 Phosphorus is visible in the evening
differ in meaning and, hence, express distinct propositions. The subargument
purports to establish that they express distinct propositions by claiming that
the proposition expressed by S1 has a property that the proposition expressed
by S2 lacks. Specifically, whereas the proposition expressed by S1 has the
property that the ancient astronomers possessed by sufficient evidence to
believe it, the proposition expressed by S2 lacks this property. By Leibniz’s
law, the propositions expressed by S1 and S2 must be distinct propositions.
It might be true that the ancient astronomers lacked sufficient evidence to
accept the sentence Phosphorus is visible in the evening. That is, it might
be true that the ancient astronomers lacked sufficient evidence to believe the
proposition conveyed by the utterance of this sentence. But Salmon (1986)
observes that if the proposition conveyed by this utterance is not the
proposition expressed, then the argument is invalid. After all, the relevant
universal instantiation of Leibniz’s law is a claim about the propositions
expressed by these sentences. So if the proposition conveyed by
Phosphorus is visible in the evening (the proposition that the ancient
astronomers lacked sufficient evidence to believe) is not the proposition that
it expresses, then we cannot validly conclude that the proposition expressed
by it is distinct from the proposition expressed by Hesperus is visible in
the evening.
According to the Millian, the meaning of a name is the object that it
denotes. Since Hesperus and Phosphorus denote the same object, Venus,
Hesperus and Phosphorus must be synonymous. Thus by composition-
ality:
Phosphorus is visible in the evening
means the same as:
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Hesperus is visible in the evening.
The meaning of Phosphorus is visible in the evening, the proposition that
it expresses, is a singular proposition about Venus—it claims of the object
Venus that it instantiates the property of being visible in the evening. Indeed
it is the very same singular proposition that Hesperus is visible in the eve-
ning expresses. Though Phosphorus is visible in the evening expresses a
singular proposition, its utterance may convey some other proposition. The
Fregean’s insight is that the utterance of Phosphorus is visible in the eve-
ning conveys a descriptive proposition—roughly, that Venus presented under
the descriptive mode of presentation, visible in the morning, is visible in the
evening. The Fregean also correctly observes that the ancient astronomers
lacked sufficient evidence to believe this descriptive proposition. From these
two observations it follows that the ancient astronomers lacked sufficient
evidence to accept the sentence Phosphorus is visible in the evening (since
the acceptance of a sentence is belief in the proposition conveyed by its
utterance). But by hypothesis, the proposition expressed by Phosphorus is
visible in the evening is a singular proposition. (N.B., we have not yet
reached the conclusion of Frege’s puzzle and so are still entertaining the truth
of Millianism.) Since the proposition conveyed is a descriptive proposition,
it must be distinct from the singular proposition expressed. But if the propo-
sition conveyed by Phosphorus is visible in the evening (the proposition
that the ancient astronomers lacked sufficient evidence to believe) is not the
proposition expressed, then we cannot validly conclude that the proposition
expressed by it is distinct from the proposition expressed by Hesperus is
visible in the evening.
The problem with FP then is this. A crucial intermediate conclusion of
FP is that:
S1 Hesperus is visible in the evening
S2 Phosphorus is visible in the evening
differ in meaning and, hence, express distinct propositions. The subargument
purports to establish that they express distinct propositions by claiming that
the proposition expressed by S1 has a property that the proposition expressed
by S2 lacks. Specifically, whereas the proposition expressed by S1 has the
property that the ancient astronomers possessed sufficient evidence to believe
it, the proposition expressed by S2 lacks this property. But this latter claim
has not been established. By hypothesis, the proposition expressed by S2 is a
singular proposition about Venus. Moreover, this proposition has the prop-
erty that the ancient astronomers possessed sufficient evidence to believe
it—indeed, they had sufficient evidence to believe it each time they looked
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into the night sky and saw Venus. The most that has been established is that
a descriptive proposition—that Venus presented under the descriptive mode of
presentation, visible in the morning, is visible in the evening—lacks the
property that the ancient astronomers possessed sufficient evidence to believe
it. But as the descriptive proposition is distinct from the singular proposition
expressed by S2, this goes nowhere towards showing that the proposition
expressed by S2 is distinct from the proposition expressed by S1.
OQA and FP are subject to the same diagnosis. In each case, reflection on
the relevant epistemic circumstances establishes at most that a descriptive
query is open, and that the ancient astronomers lacked sufficient evidence to
believe a descriptive proposition. But the validity of these arguments requires
that a singular query be open, and that the ancient astronomers lacked suffi-
cient evidence to believe a singular proposition. However, we should not
believe these corresponding claims—either because we have no reason to
believe them or because we have positive reason to deny them.
7 The Manifest Image of Linguistic Practice
Why are we prone to mistake the proposition conveyed by an utterance for
the proposition expressed?
Nonliteral utterances, pace Davidson, are familiar examples of utterances
that convey propositions distinct from the propositions expressed. In cases
familiar from philosophers’ examples, we are not tempted to identify the
proposition conveyed by a nonliteral utterance with the (literal) proposition
expressed. Many nonliteral utterances, however, are difficult to recognize as
nonliteral. Yablo (2000, p. 214) has recently remined us of this:
They put a lot of hurdles in your path, there’s a lot that could be said about that, there’s no
precedent for that, something tells me that you’re right, there are some things better left unsaid,
there is something that I forgot to tell you, viz. how to operate the lock, nothing gets my goat so
much as chewing gum in class, a lot you can do for me, let’s roll out the red carpet, the last
thing I want is to…, their people have been rising in my esteem, I took her into my confidence,
my patience is nearly exhausted, I’ll take my chances, there’s a trace of sadness in your eyes,
a growing number of these leaks can be traced to Starr’s office, she’s got a lot of smarts, let’s
pull out all the stops, let’s proceed along the lines suggested above.
Yablo (2000, p. 213) remarks of these examples that “with some of them
you have to rub your eyes and blink twice before the nonliteral aspects shine
through.” But if we fail to recognize utterances containing these expressions
as nonliteral, this is just because we are systematically mistaking the propo-
sitions that they normally convey with the propositions that they literally
express.
This phenomena is not confined to the admittedly special case of nonlit-
eral utterance. We have a general and systematic tendency to mistake the
propositions normally conveyed by our utterances with the propositions that
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they literally express. The utterance of I am tired normally conveys that the
speaker is tired; and until the work of Kaplan and Perry, many philosophers
believed that the sentence expresses the proposition that the speaker is tired.
But while the sentence normally conveys that the speaker is tired, that’s not
the proposition expressed by it relative to the context of utterance. Similarly,
the utterance of John tried to lift the suitcase normally conveys that John
failed to lift the suitcase; and until the work of Grice, many philosophers
believed that the sentence expresses (or, at least, semantically entails) that
John failed to lift the suitcase. But while the sentence normally conveys that
John failed to lift the suitcase, that’s not the proposition expressed (nor is it
semantically entailed) by it in the context of utterance.
Moreover, competent speakers’ general and systematic tendency to mistake
the proposition conveyed by an utterance for the proposition expressed by the
uttered sentence is perfectly explicable—at least given a natural picture of the
epistemology of linguistic practice. What a competent speaker consciously
understands by an utterance is what it conveys relative to the context of utter-
ance. As Thau (2002, 160) puts it, what’s conveyed by our utterances are
observational entities of linguistic practice:
The information an utterance is used to convey is an observational
entity of linguistic theory and the semantic value of an utterance is a
theoretical postulate of that theory.
To adapt Sellars’ phrase, what is conveyed by our utterances collectively con-
stitute the manifest image of our linguistic practice.
I am not claiming that competent speakers are never conscious of the
proposition expressed—the proposition expressed by an uttered sentence is
sometimes conveyed, among other things, in the context of utterance. Nor
am I claiming that competent speakers are never conscious of the proposition
expressed as the proposition expressed—that a proposition conveyed is the
proposition expressed by the uttered sentence is often manifest in the context
of utterance. Nor am I claiming that competent speakers are never able to
specify the proposition expressed by an uttered sentence—if a competent
speaker understands quotation and the relevant semantic vocabulary, then the
proposition expressed by a sentence can always be disquotationally specified.
What’s not guaranteed by a competent speaker’s understanding, however, is
that they know the proposition expressed by one sentence in a given context
is the proposition expressed by another sentence in that context that means
the same.
But if a competent speaker’s understanding two sentences that mean the
same is not sufficient for them to know that they express the same proposi-
tion in a given context, then the failures of predicate and name transparency
are not only intelligible but predictable as well. Let F and G be predicates and
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let S[…G…] be the result of substituting G in for at least one occurrence of
F in S[…F…]. If a competent speaker can understand two sentences
S[…F…] and S[…G…] that mean the same without knowing that they
express the same proposition, then such a speaker can, without irrationality
or pragmatic incoherence, accept one without accepting the other. Thus, sup-
posing that good means just the same as some descriptive predicate F , a
competent speaker could, without irrationality or pragmatic incoherence,
accept the sentence Everything good is good without accepting Everything
F is good. But if they do, such a speaker would understand the synonymous
predicates good and F but not possess sufficient evidence to know that they
apply to the same range of things. Thus predicate transparency would fail.
Similarly, name transparency would fail as well. Let a and b  be names and
let S[…b…] be the result of substituting b in for at least one occurrence of a
in S[…a…]. If a competent speaker can understand two sentences S[…a…]
and S[…b…] that mean the same without knowing that they express the
same proposition, then such a speaker can, without irrationality or pragmatic
incoherence, accept one without accepting the other. Thus, supposing that
Hesperus means just the same as Phosphorus, a competent speaker could,
without irrationality or pragmatic incoherence, accept the sentence Hesperus
is visible in the evening without accepting Phosphorus is visible in the
evening. But if they do, such a speaker would understand the synonymous
names Hesperus and Phosphorus but not possess sufficient evidence to
know that they denote to the same thing. Thus name transparency would fail
as well.
8 Bracketing Meaning Platonism
The reformulations of the open question argument and Frege’s puzzle in
terms of Leibniz’s law helped us to see what is wrong with their original,
metalinguistic formulations. They did so because crucial premises linking
epistemic features of sentences with their meanings were interpreted as uni-
versal instantiations of Leibniz’s law. It was possible to so-interpret these
principles given the following meaning platonist assumptions: There are
propositions. Propositions are the objects of attitudes like belief, assertion,
etc. Propositions are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. The meaning of
a (context insensitive) sentence is the proposition that it expresses. Evidence
is primarily evidence for the truth or falsity of a proposition. Propositions are
primarily open or closed. The acceptance of a sentence is belief in the propo-
sition conveyed by it in the context of utterance.
However, these meaning platonist assumptions, though in some ways
quite natural, are controversial. Moreover, it is possible to accept the open
question argument and Frege’s puzzle as sound and not be a meaning plato-
nist. So it would seem that the case against the metalinguistic versions of
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these arguments is hampered by an optional and controversial meaning plato-
nism.
Nevertheless, if the picture of the epistemology of linguistic practice
sketched in the previous section is approximately correct, then there is reason
to reject these arguments as unsound that does not assume meaning plato-
nism. Without making some platonist background assumptions, it is impos-
sible to interpret the target principles as universal instantiations of Leibniz’s
law. So an antiplatonist who accepts these arguments as sound must under-
stand the target principles as something other than universal instantiations of
Leibniz’s law. But that means that the target principles are open to denial in
the way they could not be if they were understood as universal instantiations
of Leibniz’s law. Indeed, given how the theory/observation distinction is
deployed within linguistic practice, there is reason to deny these principles
so-interpreted.
Suppose that what’s conveyed by our utterances collectively constitute the
manifest image of linguistic practice. Suppose, that is, that the observational
entities of linguistic practice, what a competent speaker consciously under-
stands by an utterance, is what’s conveyed by that utterance. But suppose that
the meanings of uttered sentences are theoretical entities of linguistic practice,
at least to this extent: that merely understanding two sentences is not suffi-
cient for knowing that they mean the same. If a competent speaker’s under-
standing two sentences that mean the same is not sufficient for knowing that
they mean the same, then a competent speaker could, without irrationality or
pragmatic incoherence, accept one without also accepting the other. But that
means that the Fregean premise:
If S1 and S2 mean the same, then if a competent speaker possesses
sufficient evidence in a context c to accept S1, then that speaker
possesses sufficient evidence in c to accept S2 as well.
is false (on its antiplatonist interpretation). And a similar pattern of reasoning
suffices to show that the Moorean premise:
If Q1 and Q2 mean the same, then if a competent speaker who
understands Q1 lacks sufficient evidence to know its answers (in
which case Q1 is open), then a competent speaker who understands
Q2 lacks sufficient evidence to know its answer (in which case Q2 is
open).
is itself false (on its antiplatonist interpretation).27
                                                                                                        
27 I would like to thank the participants of my UCL seminar given in Fall 2001 and the UCL
faculty colloquia where versions of this material were presented. Special thanks to James
Dreier, M.G.F. Martin, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, James Pryor, Mark van Roojen, Scott
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